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CHINESE PATENT LAW’S STATUTORY DAMAGES 
PROVISION: THE ONE SIZE THAT FITS NONE  
 
Xiaowu Li & Don Wang 
Abstract: The concept of statutory damages was first introduced into the 
Chinese patent regime in 2001 as a “last-resort” approach for damages calculation in 
infringement cases.  Curiously, in the following 15 years, this last-resort approach 
became so popular among the courts that it is essentially the exclusive approach today.  
This Article examines the legal and policy implications of the current statutory damages 
scheme, and concludes that the existence of statutory damages is fundamentally 
detrimental to the validity of the Chinese patent system.  Therefore, we argue that the 
statutory damages provision in Article 65 of the Patent Law of China should be 
eliminated.  This Article further provides a comparative law perspective, drawing lessons 
from U.S. copyright law, U.S. patent law, and German patent law, to illustrate that 
China’s patent system would be better off without this statutory damages provision. 
INTRODUCTION 
Let us imagine that you invented the most efficient solar panel known 
to mankind.  With this new panel, human society would not need to worry 
about its need for energy for the next millennium.  Like many inventors 
before you, you patented the solar panel and built a whole business based 
upon it with great success.  All of a sudden, other companies started to copy 
your technology without obtaining a license, stealing millions of dollars of 
business away from you.  Naturally, you took the infringers to court.  After 
an exhausting litigation, which cost you $400,000 in attorney fees, the court 
finally entered a decision in your favor, with a statutory damages award of 
—$40,000!  Out of shock and disbelief, you decided to spend more money 
to appeal the decision.  A couple months later, the appellate court rejected 
your appeal and told you that the damages award, as low as it was, was 
within the statutory range authorized by the law.  There was simply nothing 
the appellate court could do for you because the district court acted well 
within its discretion.  At the end of the day, you start to question: what was 
the point of obtaining a patent to begin with?  It provided some symbolic 
protection, but you still lost a lot financially.  As absurd as this whole story 
sounds, this is the reality many patent owners in China face under the 
Chinese patent law’s current statutory damages provision.1 
                                                           
1  Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju Fujuzhang Hezhimin Daibiao: Baohu Zhishi Chanquan Xu Qianghua 
Xingzheng Zhifa (国家知识产权局副局长何志敏代表：保护知识产权需强化行政执法) [The Deputy 
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This Article examines the legal and policy implications of the 
statutory damages provision within Article 65 of the Chinese Patent Law, 
and argues that the policy makers in China should eliminate it in its 
entirety.2  Part I of this Article describes the overall problem of inadequate 
compensation in China’s patent regime.  Part II provides an overview of the 
damages calculation regime in Chinese patent law and the origin of its 
statutory damages provision, presents evidence for the proposition that 
statutory damages are the major driving force for the low compensation 
problem, and examines the reasons why statutory damages are so prevalent.  
Part III illustrates that the current statutory damages provision in Chinese 
patent law is built on shaky legal ground, and is fundamentally detrimental 
to the entire patent system.  Part IV compares the statutory provisions in 
Chinese patent law to that of U.S. copyright law, and concludes that any 
attempt to reform the Chinese statutory provisions would be counter-
productive.  Part V provides a comparative law perspective based on U.S. 
and German patent laws to demonstrate how China can build a robust 
damages calculation scheme without the statutory damages provision. 
I. THE INADEQUATE COMPENSATION PROBLEM OF THE PATENT REGIME IN 
CHINA 
Over the past three decades, China has significantly improved its 
patent protection regime. 3   However, low damages awards in patent 
infringement cases are still subject to continuing criticism from legal 
scholars and industry players in the Chinese market.4  According to data 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Director of SIPO: We Need to Strengthen Administrative Agency Enforcement to Protect Intellectual 
Property], CHINA DAILY, Mar. 4, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/micro-
reading/interface_toutiao/2016-03-04/14586302.html. (noting the damages award in patent cases are 
consistently low, and that one factory in Zhejiang Province spent RMB 400,000 in litigating the case, but 
only received RMB 40,000 in damages award). 
2  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective 
Apr. 1, 1985, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 
2009), art. 65, translated in STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html [hereinafter Chinese 
Patent Law of 2008]. 
3  Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s Intellectual 
Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS. U.L.J. 773, 774 (2011) (noting that the empirical data and translations of 
Chinese court decisions revealed that the Chinese society has become very protective of intellectual 
property rights); Chris Neumeyer, China’s Great Leap Forward in Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/id=38625/. 
4  See e.g., Yieyie Yang, A Patent Problem: Can Chinese Courts Compare With the U.S. in 
Providing Patent Holders with Adequate Monetary Damages, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 140, 
142 (2014); Nagendra Setty & Alex Chachkes, International Patent Litigation: A Case Study Approach, 
2014 WL 788286, at *6 (2014); Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes: 
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compiled by CIELA, one of the most cited Chinese intellectual property 
analysis services, the average damages awarded in patent infringement cases 
in China from 2006 to 2013 a mere RMB 118,266.00 (approximately 
$18,253.00).5  This is only 35% of the average damages claimed by the 
patentees.6  One judge from Guangdong People’s High Court commented 
that the damages awarded in intellectual property cases are generally less 
than 5% of the actual losses suffered by plaintiffs.7  This turns out to be very 
problematic.  On one hand, there is little incentive for infringers to 
proactively avoid infringement given the “easy profits” one can make 
through infringement as compared to the low damages he or she has to pay if 
found infringing.8  On the other, the low damages award, as compared to the 
litigation costs, renders it uneconomical for patentees to enforce patent rights 
in courts.9  Consequently, the current patent protection regime in China has 
been regularly criticized as “ineffective.”10   
                                                                                                                                                                              
Intellectual Property Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 100-01 (2012); Rachel T. Wu, 
Awaking the Sleeping Dragon: The Evolving Chinese Patent Law and its Implications for Pharmaceutical 
Patents, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 562–63 (2011); Cheng Miao et al., Theory and Practice Related to 
Patent Infringement Damages, 4 CHINA PAT. & TRADEMARK 12, 20 (2009) 
http://www.cpt.cn/uploadfiles/20100414095525062.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON 
PATENT ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA, (2012) [hereinafter USPTO Report], 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/China_Report_on_Patent_Enforcement_(FullRprt)FINAL.pdf.  
5 Analysing Patent Civil Infringement Cases, CIELA, http://www.ciela.cn/en/analysis/patents  
[hereinafter CIELA REPORT] (register/login; follow “ANALYSE CASES” hyperlink; then follow “Civil 
Infringements” hyperlink; then follow “Generate Report” hyperlink). 
6  Id.  
7  Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚报), Zhishi Chanquan An Weihe Peichang Nan (知识产权案
为何赔偿难 ) [Why it is Difficult to Reach Fair Compensations in Intellectual Property Cases], 
NEWS.163.COM (Apr. 23, 2015), http://news.163.com/15/0423/14/ANT3OVHT00014AED.html. 
8  Campbell & Pecht, supra note 4, at 101; see also Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection in China: Litigation, Economic Damages, and Case Strategies, in ECONOMIC 
APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY, LITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT 11.401, 11.406 
(Gregory K. Leonard & Lauren J. Stiroh eds., 2005), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_IP1138.pdf 
(noting that a proper level of damages awards can deter infringers and the traditionally low damages 
awards in patent infringement cases in China are hurting the country’s ability to effectively enforce patent 
rights). 
9  See Wanshan Zhuanli Qinquan Sunhai Peichang Zhidu Haixu Shichang Jizhi Peihe (完善专利侵
权损害赔偿制度还需市场机制配合) [The Improvement of Patent Infringement Compensation Regime 
Requires the Assistance of Market Mechanisms], WTOIP (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.wtoip.com/news/a/20150126/8367.html (noting that patentees in China regularly face the 
dilemma of “losing money to win a patent case”); Wei Zhang, Zhishi Chanquan Qinquan Huo Peier 
Zhengti Piandi (知识产权侵权获赔额整体偏低) [The Overall Compensation for Intellectual Property 
Infringement is Too Low], SUPREME COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2013/04/id/948907.shtml. 
10  Campbell & Pecht, supra note 4, at 101. 
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Notably, the policy makers in China explicitly acknowledge that the 
current low compensation level is a systematic problem of China’s patent 
regime.11  For example, in early 2015, the Supreme People’s Court of China 
submitted a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress detailing its review of patent law enforcement.12  In the report, the 
Court specifically identified low damages awards as one of the key problems 
in the current patent regime, and the Court made several pointed 
recommendations of corrective measures.13  In the official commentary to 
the proposed Fourth Amendment to the China’s Patent Law, the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) similarly lists “low compensations” as 
one of the five major challenges in patent enforcement.14  Accordingly, there 
is a tremendous consensus among the stakeholders of China’s patent system 
that inadequate compensation for patent infringement hinders China’s patent 
regime from further development, and there is an urgent need for 
comprehensive solutions to this problem.  
II. THE STATUTORY DAMAGES SCHEME AS THE DRIVING FORCE OF THE 
UNDER-COMPENSATION PROBLEM 
There are several theories to explain why damages awards in China’s 
patent cases are so low, such as incompetence of the courts and the 
government’s adherence to Confucian principles of community 
commitment.15   However, the most convincing theory attributes the low 
                                                           
11  Due to the unique structure of Chinese government, both the courts and executive agencies in 
China actively participate in the legislation process. Therefore, these institutions are generally considered 
key “policy makers.” 
12  Zuigao Fayuan: Wanshan Zhuanli Qinquan Suihai Peichang Zhidu (最高法院：完善专利侵权损
害赔偿制度) [Supreme People’s Court: The improvement of the Current Compensation Regime of Patent 
Protection], CNIPR (Mar. 5, 2015), 
http://www.cnipr.com/sfsj/zscqfy/201503/t20150305_186983.htm?COLLCC=2247291050&. 
13  Id. 
14  Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa Xiugai Zaoan (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) De 
Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国专利法修改草案（征求意见稿）》的说明) [The Commentary on 
the Proposed Draft of Amendment to the Patent Law of China (Draft for Public Comments)], STATE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF P.R.C. (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/zcjd/201504/t20150402_1096196.html [hereinafter SIPO Commentary on 
Fourth Amendment]; Zhuanli Lifa Wenda: Zhuanli Fa Disici Quanmian Xiugai (专利立法问答：专利法
第四次全面修改) [Q&As on Patent Legislation: The Fourth Comprehensive Amendment of the Patent 
Law of China], STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF P.R.C. (Apr. 24, 2015), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ywzt/zlfjqssxzdscxg/xylzlfxg/201504/t20150424_1107544.html [hereinafter 
Q&As on Fourth Amendment]. 
15  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 148–52; Edward J. Walneck, The Patent Troll or Dragon?: How 
Quantity Issues and Chinese Nationalism Explain Recent Trends in Chinese Patent Law, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L 
& COMP. LAW 435, 442–44 (2014). 
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damages awards to the methodologies used when calculating damages. 16 
Particularly, the predominance of statutory damages awards systematically 
drive down the overall compensation level in patent cases. 
A. An Overview of Patent Damages Calculations in China 
To further the analysis of this Article, it is instructive to provide an 
overview of damages calculation methodologies in patent cases in China and 
their application in reality.  Article 65 of Chinese Patent Law of 2008 
provides:  
The amount of compensation for patent right infringement shall 
be determined according to the patentee’s actual losses caused 
by the infringement.  If it is hard to determine the actual losses, 
the amount of compensation may be determined according to 
the benefits acquired by the infringer through the infringement.  
If it is hard to determine the losses of the patentee [and] the 
benefits acquired by the infringer, the amount of the 
compensation may be determined according to the reasonably 
multiplied amount of the royalties of that patent.  The amount 
of compensation shall include the reasonable expenses paid by 
the patentee for putting an end to the infringement.  If the losses 
of the patentee, benefits of the infringer, [and] royalties of the 
patent are all hard to determine, the people’s court may, on the 
basis of the factors such as the type of patent right, nature of the 
infringement, and seriousness of the case, determine the amount 
of compensation within the range from 10,000 to 1,000,000 
yuan (approximately $1,542 to $154,248 USD).17 
As the statute indicates, the primary calculation method for patent 
infringement actions should be based on patentee’s actual losses resulting 
from the infringement. 18   Specifically, the Supreme People’s Court has 
instructed the lower courts to consider “a reasonable profit of a patented 
product” multiplied by the “number of patented products that patentee was 
unable to sell due to the infringement” to determine the “patentee’s loss.”19  
                                                           
16  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 148–51; Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 16–18. 
17  Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, art. 65. 
18  Id. 
19  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhuanli Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falv Wenti De Ruogan 
Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理专利纠纷案件适用法律问题的若干规定) [Several Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Dispute Cases] 
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, June 6, 2001, amended for the first time by the Supreme 
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This approach reflects the general principle of equity found in Chinese civil 
law, which aims to bring an injured party back to the same, but not a more 
advantageous, position prior to the infringement.20  However, even though a 
patentee’s loss is the primary calculation method in theory, it is rarely used 
in practice. 21   In China, plaintiffs bear the burden to produce sufficient 
evidence to establish the loss of sales as a result of the infringement, and in 
most cases, they are unable to do so.22  
As a patentee’s loss is almost impossible to establish, courts next look 
into the infringer’s profits resulting from the infringement.  The Supreme 
People’s Court instructed the lower courts to multiply a “reasonable profit of 
an infringing product” by the “quantity of the subject infringing products 
available on the market” to determine the “infringer’s profits.”23  However, 
patentees encounter essentially the same obstacles here as they do in 
establishing their loss.  Like the patentee’s loss approach, patentees are 
similarly required to produce sufficient evidence to prove the infringer’s 
profits.24  Such evidence is more likely in the infringers’ possession and 
rarely does an infringer cooperate with the court in disclosing it.25  
If a patentee is unable to establish either its actual loss or the 
infringer’s profits, the patentee can seek damages based on a “reasonable 
royalty.”  However, the applicability of this approach is extremely narrow in 
reality as the courts require the patentee to supply at least one existing 
license agreement regarding the disputed patent to establish the “royalty 
                                                                                                                                                                              
People’s Court, Feb. 25, 2013, amended for the second time by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 19, 2015, 
effective Feb. 1, 2015), art. 20, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/sfjs/201510/t20151021_1191718.html) 
[hereinafter Several Provisions 2015] (Article 20 provides that “the ‘actual loss’ under Patent Law Article 
65 can be determined by multiplying the number of patent products that patentee was unable to sell due to 
the infringement by a reasonable profit per product. If it is hard to determine the decreased number of 
patent products resulting from the infringement, the actual loss can be determined by multiplying the 
number of the subject infringing products available on the market by a reasonable profit per product.”). 
20  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 146. 
21  Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 17.  
22  Id.; USPTO REPORT, supra note 4. 
23  Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19 (noting that the infringer’s profits under Patent Law 
Article 65 can be determined by multiplying the quantity of subject infringing products available on the 
market by a reasonable profit of an infringing product). 
24  Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 17–18. 
25  Id.; Li-ming Li (李黎明), Zhuanli Qinquan Fading Peichang Zhong de Zhuti Tezheng he Chanye 
Shuxing Yanjiu (专利侵权法定赔偿中的主体特征和产业属性研究) [Research on the Subject Nature and 
Industrial Characteristics of Statutory Compensation in Patent Infringement], 37 No. 4 MOD. L. SCI. 170, 
171 (July 2015), http://www.iprcn.com/UploadFiles/20151127100491861.pdf (noting that a lot of 
companies relying on the excuse that its accounting system is under-developed to refuse to supply the 
evidence needed to conduct damages calculation). 
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rate.”26  In other words, patentees who have never licensed their patent or 
patentees who licensed their technology at no monetary cost, such as a cross-
licensing agreement, cannot deploy this method of damages calculation at all.  
Where such a license agreement exists, the courts may use the royalty rate in 
the license as a starting point, and consider adjusting factors, such as the 
type of the subject patent, the nature and circumstances of the infringement, 
and the nature, scope, and duration of the reference license.27  
Finally, when all three methods mentioned above fail, the court will 
impose statutory damages ranging between RMB 10,000 to RMB 1,000,000 
(approximately $1,542 to $154,248).  In determining the statutory damages, 
the court may consider factors such as the type of the patent and the nature 
and circumstances of the infringement.28  Even today, there is little guidance 
from the statute itself or from the Supreme People’s Court on how to apply 
this approach.  It is not entirely clear whether this statutory damages 
provision is compensatory or punitive in nature.  There is some suggestion 
that this provision was first introduced for compensatory purposes. 29 
However, the Supreme People’s Court’s instruction for lower courts to 
assess “the nature and the circumstances of the infringement” factor implies 
that this provision also encompasses punitive considerations.30 
B. The Origin of the Statutory Damages in Chinese Patent Law  
Early versions of the Patent Law of China did not contain a statutory 
damages provision.31  The concept of statutory damages was first introduced 
                                                           
26  Yuan Xiaodong, Research on the Regulations of Patent Infringement Indemnification in China, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/Yuan%20Xiaodong%20paper.pdf.  
27  Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19, art. 21.  
28  Id.  
29  See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.  
30  Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19, art. 21. See also Hongyan Shi (石红艳) & Shengye Lin 
(林声烨),   Zhishi Chanquan Qinquan Yinru Chengfaxing Peichang Zhibian (知识产权侵权引入惩罚性赔
偿之辩) [The Debate on Introducing Punitive Damages into Intellectual Property Protection], 3 INTELL. 
PROP. (2013), http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_80421.shtml (noting that the “nature and 
circumstances” analysis indicates the punitive nature of the statutory damages under Article 65 of Chinese 
Patent Law). 
31  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [The Patent Law of 
P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2000/08/id/38517.shtml [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law of 1984]; 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa 1992 Nian Xiuzheng An (中华人民共和国专利法 1992年修正
案) [The 1992 Amendment to The Patent Law of P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Sept. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/fl/201509/t20150906_1171275.html [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law of 
1992]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa 2000 Xiuzheng An (中华人民共和国专利法 2000年修
216 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  2 
 
in 2001 by the Supreme People’s Court in its judicial interpretations of the 
Chinese Patent Law of 2000.32  The 2001 judicial interpretations specify that 
when a court is unable to apply the formal damages calculation approaches 
— patentee’s losses, the infringer’s profits, and the reasonable royalty — to 
determine a damages award in a patent case, it may award a “fixed amount 
of damages” between RMB 5,000 to RMB 300,000 (approximately $772 to 
$46,304).33  The Chinese Patent Law of 2008 formally codified the statutory 
damages in its Article 65, but raised the statutory ranges to RMB 10,000-
RMB 1,000,000 (approximately $1,543 to $154,345).34   This controlling 
provision remains intact today.35 
The legislative intent behind the 2001 judicial interpretations relating 
to the statutory damages is not entirely clear.  One popular theory is that it 
was heavily influenced by the ongoing development of Chinese Copyright 
Law provisions relating to the statutory damages.36  As early as 1995, the 
Beijing High People’s Court issued an advisory opinion that is believed to 
be the first attempt to advocate a statutory damages approach in intellectual 
property cases.37  The opinion provides that: 
                                                                                                                                                                              
正案) [The 2000 Amendment to the Patent Law of P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 25, 2000), http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2000/08/id/38517.shtml [hereinafter 
Chinese Patent Law of 2000]. 
32 [Zuigaorenmingfayuanguanyushenlizhuanlijiufenanjianshiyongfalvweintideruoganguiding] (最高
人民法院关于审理专利纠纷案件适用法律问题的若干规定 ) [Several Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Issues Concerning Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies] (promulgated 
by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 22, 2001, effective July 1, 2001), art. 21, 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=1853&lib=law&SearchJCeyword=patent%25 [hereinafter Several 
Provisions 2001]. 
33  Id. 
34  Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2. 
35  See Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19. 
36  Even though it is not an official policy, the policy makers in China regularly look to the 
development of copyright law in setting the course for patent law. For example, the Supreme People’s 
Court issued its most recent Judicial Interpretation of Patent Law on March 22, 2016, and the Court 
specifically acknowledges that several of the new interpretations were based on the court’s experience with 
the enforcement of the Chinese Copyright Law. See Jing Liu (刘婧), Tongyi Xihua Zhuanli Qinquan 
Caipan Biaozhun Yingzao Youliyu Chuangxin de Fazhi Huanjin (统一细化专利侵权裁判标准 营造有利
于创新的法制环境) [Setting Unified and Specified Standards for Patent Infringement Adjudication and 
Creating Legal Environment that Helps Innovation], CHINA COURTS (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/03/id/1826733.shtml?from=singlemessage&isappinstalled=0. 
37  Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Shenli Jisuanji Ruanjian Zhuzuoquan Jiufen 
Anjian De Jige Wenti De Yijian De Tongzhi (北京市高级人民法院关于印发《关于审理计算机软件著作
权纠纷案件的几个问题的意见》的通知) [Beijing People’s High Court Publishes the Opinion on Several 
Issues on the Trial of the Software Copyright Disputes], CNIPR (Feb. 1, 2012), t 
http://www.cnipr.net/article_show.asp?article_id=221 (last visited on Dec. 20, 2015). 
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If the claimant in a copyright infringement case cannot 
prove its actual loss or the unlawful gains of the infringer, 
the infringer needs to compensate the right holder ranging 
from RMB 5,000 to RMB 30,000.  However, if the 
infringer proved with sufficient evidence that he did not 
know his action infringed the copyright of the right holder 
and the resulting infringement is not serious, the court may 
exercise its discretion to decrease the statutory damages to 
an amount lower than RMB 5,000.38  
In 2001, the same year in which statutory damages were first introduced into 
the patent law through judicial interpretation, the Copyright Law of China 
formally codified the statutory damages in Article 48. 39   The statute reads 
that “in a copyright infringement case, if the actual loss of the right holder 
and the unlawful gains of the infringer is hard to measure, the court may 
award the right holder statutory damages lower than RMB 500,000 by its 
discretion.”40  This appeared to be the court’s attempt to establish a uniform 
standard for calculating damages for copyright infringement in light of the 
challenges posed by rise of software copyright, and this attempt likely 
spilled over to patent law.  
 On top of the influence of the copyright law, another impetus for 
introducing the concept of statutory damages was to handle the difficulties in 
determining the patentee’s actual losses and infringer’s profits in patent 
cases.41 Accordingly, the statutory damages served as a last-resort approach 
to guarantee some minimal compensation available for injured patentees.42   
The order of preference for the four damages calculation methods as listed in 
Article 65 of the Patent Law confirms that the statutory damages approach is 
supposed to be deployed as the last resort.43  
                                                           
38  Id.  
39  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa 2001 Nian Xiuzheng (中华人民共和国著作权法
2001年修正) [Copyright Law of P.R.C. of 2001] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 27, 2001), art. 48, 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/bq/fljxzfg/201310/t20131025_863141.html [hereinafter Chinese 
Copyright Law of 2001]. 
40  Id. 
41  Yuan Xiaodong, supra note 26, at 8-9. 
42  Id. 
43  Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, art. 65 (noting that the four calculation methods should 
be deployed in the following sequential order in term of preference: 1) patentee’s losses, 2) infringer’s 
profits, 3) reasonable royalty, and 4) statutory damages); see also, Several Provisions 2001, supra note 32, 
art. 21. 
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C. The Predominance of the Statutory Damages  
Ironically, the alleged “last-resort” approach of statutory damages 
became so overwhelmingly popular among the courts that it is essentially the 
exclusive method for damages calculations today.  One survey concluded 
that, between 2002 and 2010, 94.8% of all the patent cases calculated 
damages under the statutory damages approach. 44   According to another 
survey conducted by China Patent Agent (Hong Kong) Ltd., the peak year 
was 2009 when more than 99% of patent damages awards were based on the 
statutory damages approach, and the average award was a little less than 
RMB 100,000 (approximately $15,425).45  The situation appears to improve 
only slightly after the Third Amendment to Patent Law took effect in 2009.  
Statistics reveal that from 2008 to 2013 courts still used the statutory 
damages approach in 97.25% of patent infringement cases.46  Essentially, 
this statutory damage provision swallowed the entire Article 65 of the 
Chinese Patent Law. 
Notably, courts rarely award damages close to the upper limit of the 
statutory range.47  Based on the survey of China Patent Agent Ltd., the 
average damages awards based on the statutory damages approach from 
2008 to 2013 was merely RMB 80,000 (approximately $12,340). 48   In 
contrast, there were 42 published patent opinions that adopted non-statutory 
damages approaches between 2002 and 2010, and the average damages 
award for these cases was RMB 2,450,000 (approximately $377,521), four 
times as much as the average award under the statutory damages approach.49  
It is pretty obvious that the predominance of statutory damages awards in 
                                                           
44  Li-ming Li, supra note 25, at 171. 
45  Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 17. 
46  LEGAL DAILY (法制日报), 97% Zhuanli Qinquan An Panjue Caiqu Fading Peichang (97%专利侵
权案判决采取法定赔偿) [97% Court Decisions on Patent Infringement Adopt Statutory Damages as the 
Method for Damages Calculation], PEOPLE.CN (Apr. 16, 2013), 
http://ip.people.com.cn/n/2013/0416/c136655-21148974.html (according to one survey conducted by the 
Intellectual Property Law Center of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, only 10% of the 
patentees choose to enforce their patent after discovering infringement, and 97.25% of patent decisions 
choose the statutory damages approach.  The research further revealed that the average damages award in 
statutory damages cases is only RMB 80,000 which is even lower than the fees needed for applying and 
maintaining a patent). 
47  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151. 
48  LEGAL DAILY, supra note 46. 
49  Li-ming Li, supra note 25, at 171. 
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patent cases significantly drives down the overall compensation level for 
patent infringement.50  
Curiously, the 2008–2013 five-year average was lower than the 
annual average of the year of 2009, even though the Third Amendment 
raised the maximum statutory damages from RMB 500,000 (approximately 
$77,124) to RMB 1,000,000 (approximately $154,248) in 2009. 51   This 
indicates that simply increasing the upper limit of the statutory damages 
range did little, if any, to alleviate the inadequate compensation problem. 
D. Explanations for the Predominance of the Statutory Damages 
Approach 
There are several reasons why the statutory damages approach is so 
popular among Chinese litigators and courts.  The most apparent reason is 
the difficulties in applying the other three damages calculation methods.52   
In China, a plaintiff generally bears the burden to produce sufficient 
evidence to establish the claimed damages.53  This is an extremely high 
burden in reality.  For example, courts generally require plaintiffs claiming 
damages under the patentee’s losses theory to supply evidence establishing: 
(1) the market demand for the patented products, (2) the patentee’s ability to 
manufacture and market the patented products, (3) the quantity of patented 
products that could have been sold but for the infringement, and (4) a 
reasonable profit for the patented product.54  Here, courts specifically require 
the plaintiff to prove a direct causation between the infringement and the 
patentee’s loss, which is extremely difficult to do.55   
To establish damages under the infringer’s profits theory, a court 
generally requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) that the allegedly infringing 
products are available on the market, (2) the quantity of infringing products 
                                                           
50  Id. (noting that, in cases where statutory damages approach is adopted, the average damages award 
is RMB 80,000, whereas the average damages award is RMB 150,000 where the other three approaches are 
used to calculate the damages); Chinese Intellectual Property Judges Panel, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
61, 63 (2011) (Professor Yi Jianiong from the Southwest University of Political Science & Law pointed out 
that the predominance of statutory awards drove down the average damages awards in patent cases and a 
patentee can only get 15% of what he claims on average); Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151. 
51  LEGAL DAILY, supra note 46; Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2. 
52  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 148–50.  
53  Id.  
54  Yuan Xiaodong, supra note 26, at 5–6.  
55  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 150. 
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available on the market, (3) the reasonable profits of an infringing product, 
and (4) the actual profits obtained by the infringer.56   
To claim damages under the reasonable royalty theory, a plaintiff 
must supply an actual license agreement of the patent, something that few 
plaintiffs are able to provide.57   
To make matters worse, there is very little discovery in China, and the 
accused infringers generally have no obligation or incentive to produce the 
requested documents.58   Nor can courts in China effectively compel the 
production of documents, which leaves the infringer to dictate the agenda by 
deciding whether he will cooperate in turning over the requested evidence.59 
As a result, plaintiffs in most patent cases fail to produce sufficient evidence 
to establish damages under the first three calculation methods and are forced 
to resort to the statutory damages approach.  
Beneath the surface, courts also have ample reasons to prefer statutory 
damages over the other three approaches in determining damages awards.60 
For one thing, courts in China are under enormous time pressure when 
adjudicating patent cases.61  Typically, it only takes a Chinese trial court six 
to seven months to adjudicate an entire patent case which includes both the 
liability determination and the damages determination.62  Similarly, a typical 
patent appeal only takes three to four months.63  For companies used to U.S.-
style multi-year patent litigation, the Chinese courts are “rocket dockets.”64 
Compared to the statutory damages approach, the other three methods are 
substantially more time-consuming to apply since extensive fact-finding and 
evidence examination are typically required.  Consequently, courts eager to 
meet deadlines and get the docket moving are inherently biased in deploying 
                                                           
56  Yuan Xiaodong, supra note 26, at 6–7. 
57  Id. 
58  CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CASE COMMENTARIES §1.14 (2014). 
59  Id.; Yangcheng Evening News, supra note 7 (noting that the alleged infringer regularly refuses to 
produce book keeping records and other financial documents necessary to determine damages). 
60  In theory, the courts should consider the other three methods before resorting to the statutory 
damages approach.  However, in reality, the courts exercise great discretion over whether to admit relevant 
evidence pertaining to the damages calculation.  Accordingly, whether a statutory damages approach is 
adopted is a matter of discretion for the courts.  
61  Anthony C. Chen, Benefiting From China’s Booming Market Without Losing Control of Your 
Crown Jewels: IP Issues for Foreign Business in China, 2011 WL 2532948, at *5 (2011). 
62  Id.; see also, CIELA Report, supra note 5.  
63  Chen, supra note 61, at *5. It shall be noted that the legal system in China is different from the 
U.S. system in terms of the scope of review. A Chinese appeal court can review factual issues as well as 
legal issues.  
64  Id. 
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calculation methodologies in patent cases.  Moreover, courts applying the 
statutory damages approach are less likely to be overturned on appeals, even 
if the award is unjustifiably low.65  Damages awards under the statutory 
damages approach are highly discretionary, and patentees usually have few 
viable arguments to challenge the decisions on appeal. 66   This type of 
appeal-proof opinion is particularly attractive to the lower court judges in 
light of the Chinese judicial system’s long history of penalizing lower court 
judges based on reversal rates of their cases.67 
III. LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR ELIMINATING STATUTORY 
DAMAGES 
A careful examination of the statutory damages’ justifications and 
policy implications reveals that statutory damages no longer serve any 
legitimate purpose in China’s patent system and actually cause more harm 
than good.  
A. The Justification of the Statutory Damages Based on TRIPs 
Obligation is Misleading  
Some scholars in China attempted to justify the Patent Law’s statutory 
damages provision by characterizing it as an obligation under the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs agreement), of which China is a 
                                                           
65  Congying Xu (徐聪颖), Woguo Zhuanli Quan Fading Peichang de Shijian he Fansi (我国专利权
法定赔偿的实践和反思) [The Experiment of and the Reflection on the Statutory Damages Provision in 
Chinese Patent Law], IPR CHINA (Mar. 9, 2015), 
http://www.iprcn.com/IL_Lwxc_Show.aspx?News_PI=2511 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (the author 
sampled 405 patent damages decision under the statutory damages approach, and found patentees appeared 
in 223 cases, but only 7 cases, or 3.86% of the appealed cases, were successful); IP-Lantai (兰台知识产权
团队), Chengfa Xing Peichang Zhidu Neng Jiejue Zhuanli Peichang Di de Jiongjing Ma? (惩罚性赔偿制
度能解决专利侵权赔偿低的窘境吗？) [Can Punitive Damages Solve the Dilemma of Low Damages 
Awards in Patent Infringement?], INTELLIGEAST (Apr. 29, 2015), http://zhihedongfang.com/article-9598/ 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (noting that statutory damages in patent cases provide judges a shield from 
being labeled as “radical” in China). 
66  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151. 
67  For a very long time, the courts in China evaluated lower court judges’ performances under the so-
called “judicial responsibility system”, which penalized judges with high reversal rates and promoted 
judges with lower reversal rates on appeal.  However, the “judicial responsibility system” was recently 
abandoned.  See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial 
Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M. L. REV. 63, 67–73 (2009); Nathan Snyder, Putting Numbers to 
Feelings: Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in China’s Courts –Evidence from Zhejiang Province 
Trademark Infringement Cases 2004-2009, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 349, 370 (2012).   
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member state.68  This contention is rather misleading.  Granted, the WTO 
and related international treaties profoundly shaped the intellectual property 
regime in China, and many of the current Patent Law provisions do reflect 
TRIPs obligations.69  However, the TRIPs provision relating to statutory 
damages is permissive, not mandatory.70  Article 45 of the TRIPs agreement 
provides that each member state’s “judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to 
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered[,]” but only “[i]n 
appropriate cases, Member may authorize the judicial authorities to order 
recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages . . . .”71  The 
TRIPs agreement provides no definition for the “appropriate cases,” but 
rather leaves it to each member state to tailor this provision according to its 
domestic concerns.72 
Further, Article 45 of the TRIPs agreement is a general provision 
concerning damages for all intellectual property rights.  Even if, arguendo, 
this provision could be interpreted to require each member state to preserve 
the statutory damages scheme in some form as a compensation mechanism, 
it does not necessarily follow that the member state has to preserve it in all 
intellectual property fields.  For example, the United States provides 
statutory damages in its copyright law but not in its patent law.73  Nobody 
seems to suggest that this arrangement results in a violation of the TRIPs 
agreement.  Finally, even among the member states of the TRIPs agreement, 
                                                           
68  Yan Hu (胡燕), Zhuanli Fa Disanci Xiugai Yu TRIPS Xieyi (专利法第三次修改与 TRIPS协议) 
[The Third Amendment to the Patent Law and the TRIPS Agreement], LAWTIME.CN (Apr. 4, 2007), 
http://www.lawtime.cn/info/zhuanli/zlnews/2007040435396.html (noting that the addition of statutory 
damages provision in the third amendment to the patent law is a reflection of the Article 45 of the TRIPS 
agreement). 
69  Natalie P. Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO over China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 34 
SYDNEY L. REV. 65 (2012); Walneck, supra note 15, at 439; Joshua J. Galgano, Patent Reform under the 
America Invents Act: Does China’s Success After the 2009 Chinese Patent Reform Predict Similar Success 
for the U.S. Patent Regime?, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 199–200 (2014); Raymond M. 
Gabriel, The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intellectual Property Law, Policy, and 
Practice Are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection in China, 9 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 323, 332 
(2008); Guangliang Zhang, Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Chinese 
Law, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 35, 67–68 (2001). 
70  Pamela Samuelson, Phil Hill & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages: A Rarity in Copyright Laws 
Internationally, but for How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 529, 565–66 (2013). 
71  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 45, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 
Stat. 4809, [hereinafter TRIPs] (emphasis added), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
72  Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 565–66; see generally Henning Grosse Ruse-
Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-plus Free Trade Agreements: 
Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2011). 
73  Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (the damages provision for U.S. copyright law), with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 (2012) (the damages provision for U.S. patent law).  
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a statutory damages provision is an exception, rather than the norm. 74  
Therefore, the contention that the TRIPs agreement mandates a statutory 
damages provision in Chinese Patent Law is simply nonsensible and 
unsupported.  
B. The Justification Based on Consistency of IP Protections is 
Unconvincing  
As discussed above, it is possible that the statutory damages provision 
in China’s patent law is a spillover/parallel of the statutory damages 
provision found in China’s copyright law.75  Accordingly, another potential 
justification for the patent law’s statutory damages provision is to maintain 
the consistency among the branches of intellectual property protection, as 
the statutory damages award is available in both China’s Copyright Law and 
the Trademark Law. 76   However, this argument is quite unpersuasive 
because the three major branches of intellectual property law have already 
diverged significantly as the result of independent development.  For 
example, the lower limit for patent statutory damages is RMB 10,000 
whereas there is no minimum statutory damages in trademark or copyright 
law. 77   There does not seem to be any satisfying justification for this 
particular inconsistency.  One might theorize that the different treatments are 
driven by the fact that a patent, on average, retains a higher valuation than a 
copyrighted work or a registered trademark. However, the fact that 
trademark law recently raised the maximum statutory damages to RMB 
3,000,000, which triples the maximum statutory damages for patent 
infringements, effectively rebuts this theory.78 
                                                           
74  Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 565–66; see also Pamela Samuelson & Tara 
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
439, 441 (2009). 
75  See supra Part IIB. 
76  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright Law of 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, 
effective June 1, 1991), art. 48, translated in STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/relatedlaws/200804/t20080416_380362.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2016); 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of People’s 
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective 
Mar. 1, 1983), art. 63, http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/flfg1/flfg/201309/t20130903_137807.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2016). 
77  See Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, at art. 65; Copyright Law of People’s Republic of 
China, supra note 76, at art. 48; Trademark Law of People’s Republic of China, supra note 76, at art. 63. 
78  See Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, at art. 65; Trademark Law of People’s Republic of 
China, supra note 76, at art. 63. 
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Moreover, unfair competition law is often viewed as another major 
branch of intellectual property law in China, and a comparison of the 
damages provisions between patent law and unfair competition law is 
particularly illuminating to the analysis here.79  Article 20 of the Unfair 
Competition Law provides two damages calculation methods that are similar 
to the patent law: (1) the actual losses of the injured party, and (2) the 
accused party’s unlawful gains resulting from the unlawful practice.80  There 
is no statutory damages approach available when determining unfair 
competition damages.81  Without statutory damages as a shortcut, courts are 
forced to apply the injured party’s losses approach and infringer’s profits 
approach honestly in determining damages.  
Case law demonstrates that courts are more than competent to 
determine fair damages in unfair competition claims without employing the 
statutory damages method.  For example, in Qihoo 360 Tech. Co., Ltd. v. 
Sogou Info. Serv. Co., Ltd., the plaintiff Sogou Information Services 
Company (Sogou) brought an unfair competition claim against its 
competitor Qihoo 360 Technology Company (Qihoo).82  The court found 
that Qihoo, as the developer of the anti-virus software 360 Total Security, 
violated the Unfair Competition Law of China by designing 360 Total 
Security to improperly interfere with the consumers’ ability to install and use 
the Sogou internet browser.83  In determining the damages award, the court 
provided a specific illustration of the damages calculation claimed by the 
plaintiff, detailing the internet browser’s sales and profit models.84  Even 
                                                           
79  Chengsi Zheng (郑成思), Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng: Zhishi Chanquan de Fujia Baohua (反不
正当竞争：知识产权的附加保护 ) [Unfair Competition Law: The Complementary Protection for 
Intellectual Property], IOLAW.ORG.CN, http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=4017 (last visited Mar. 
12, 2016); Yadong Wang & Lei Lu, The PRC Anti-unfair Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Protection, CHINA BUS. J. 62 (Feb. 2010), 
http://cblj.com/cblj/correspondent/1dfba0b743ddfb65b2e9e41ffa1abc32.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2016). 
80  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和国反不正当竞争
法) [Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 20, translated in STATE INTELL. 
PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C., http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/relatedlaws/200804/t20080416_380359.html 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016).  
81  Id. 
82  Beijing Qihu Keji Youxian Gongsi yu Beijing Sougou Xinxi Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Buzhengdang 
Jingzheng An (北京奇虎科技有限公司与北京搜狗信息服务有限公司不正当竞争案) [Qihoo 360 Tech. 
Co., Ltd. v. Sogou Info. Serv. Co., Ltd.], CIVIL HIGH COURT (IP) FINAL TRIAL NO. 1071 (Beijing High 
People’s Ct. 2015) [hereinafter Qihoo v. Sogou], 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/content/content?DocID=2748b533-1938-472f-b7e8-
6afafb820acf&KeyWord=(2015)高民(知)终字第 1071号 (last visited Dec. 28, 2015). 
83  Id. 
84  Id. 
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though the amount of damages proposed by plaintiff was not fully adopted, 
the court nonetheless found plaintiff’s user-based model for profits 
calculation persuasive.85  Based on this model and statistics compiled by an 
independent consulting company, i-Research Consulting Group, the court 
concluded that Sogou lost approximately two million users as a result of 
Qihoo’s unfair competition practice, and rendered an adequate compensation 
accordingly. 86   This case illustrates that courts in China are capable of 
rendering a fair damages award without deploying the statutory damages 
method.  Even assuming that maintaining consistency among all branches of 
China’s intellectual property regime is a legitimate policy goal, Qihoo v. 
Sogou makes a compelling argument that the statutory damages provisions 
in China’s different IP regimes should be eliminated altogether. Therefore, 
the justification based on consistency of China’s intellectual property 
protection regimes is not only unconvincing, but also self-defeating.   
C. The Argument That Patentees Prefer Statutory Damages is 
Illogical 
In real practice, a patentee in China may forego the other three more 
burdensome damages calculation methods and directly request the court to 
apply the statutory damages approach.  A survey conducted by the 
Intellectual Property Law Center at the Zhongnan University of Economics 
and Law indicates that patentees did so in 93.2% of cases.87   Based on this 
statistic, some argue that the statutory damages approach is actually 
preferred by patentees.88   However, this argument is illogical because it 
confuses cause and effect.  As illustrated above, a patentee’s damages claim 
based on the three non-statutory-damages approaches rarely succeeds in 
court due to the heavy evidentiary burden and the courts’ subtle bias against 
these methodologies. 89   It would be absurd to assume that patentees, as 
practical and rational beings, would dispense resources unnecessarily in an 
attempt to satisfy the other three more demanding approaches, which are 
destined to fail in most cases.  In other words, the majority of patentees 
                                                           
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Zhixing Chen, Fading Peichang Weihe Zaoshou Goubing? (法定赔偿为何遭受诟病?) [Why is 
the Statutory Damages Award Heavily Criticized?], ZHICHANLI.COM, 
http://www.zhichanli.com/article/7968 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
88  Id. 
89  See supra Part IID.  
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directly requested the statutory damages approach because of the futility of 
doing otherwise, not because of their preference for statutory damages.90  
D. Statutory Damages are Detrimental to the Legitimacy of 
China’s Patent System 
A more fundamental problem with a statutory damages award is that it 
is so inherently “arbitrary, inconsistent, [and] unprincipled” that it is 
detrimental to the legitimacy of China’s patent system.91  
When determining statutory damages, the Supreme People’s Court 
instructed the lower courts to consider factors including the type of the 
patent and the infringement’s nature and circumstances.92  As a theoretical 
issue, it is unclear how to engage in this analysis consistently, and whether 
the lower courts should conduct extensive fact-findings and evidence 
examinations when assessing these two factors.  If extensive fact-findings 
and evidence-examinations are required, there seems to be no need for the 
statutory damages approach since it will essentially collapse into the 
patentee’s losses approach or the infringer’s profits approach.93  
As a practical matter, there is little evidence that lower courts conduct 
the two-factor analysis at all when awarding statutory damages.  A typical 
opinion awarding statutory damages in a patent case reads: “Since the losses 
of the patent owner and the unlawful gains of the defendant is hard to prove, 
this court decided, at its discretion, considering the type of the patent, nature 
and circumstances of the infringement, that the damages award is RMB 
[amount awarded].”94  This widely used boilerplate language reveals few 
                                                           
90  Congying Xu, supra note 65 (discussing that the majority of the patentees are not free to choose, 
but in reality must use the damages calculation methods). 
91  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 441 (discussing how the statutory damages in U.S. 
copyright law are “arbitrary, inconsistent, [and] unprincipled”); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[E][1][a] (2012) (“[T]he truth is that statutory damages fluctuate 
wildly.”). 
92  Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19, at art. 21. 
93  The “nature and circumstances of the infringement” factor is particularly difficult to assess 
without an extensive fact-finding process. It is not entirely clear what elements the lower courts should 
consider in assessing the “nature and circumstances” factor. Logically speaking, both “patentee’s losses” 
and “infringer’s profits” should be integral parts of “nature and circumstances” factor. However, if the 
courts consider patentee’s losses or the infringer’s profits, the statutory damages analysis would be 
rendered meaningless because the analysis it entails would be the same as either the patentee’s losses 
approach or the infringer’s profits approach.   
94  See, e.g., Xushui Xian Huaguang Shizheng Jiancai Youxian Gongsi yu Tianjin Shi Jinnan Baitangkou Zhuzao 
Chang deng Zhuanli Qinquan An (徐水县华光市政建材有限公司与天津市津南白塘口铸造厂等专利侵权案) 
[Huaguang City Contr. Co., Ltd. v. Jinnan Baitangkou Foundry], JIN HIGH COURT THIRD (FINAL) TRIAL NO. 41 (Tianjin 
High People’s Ct. 2005), http://china.findlaw.cn/info/cpws/mscpws/218255_2.html; Tongxiang Shi Zili Youxian Zeren 
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justifications behind a court’s reasoning when awarding damages and 
renders the Supreme Court’s instruction on the “type of patent and the 
infringement’s nature and circumstances” factors largely superfluous.  
In addition, this mechanism of setting statutory damages makes little 
policy sense.  As mentioned before, in 2001, the Supreme People’s Court set 
a range for statutory damages between RMB 5,000 to RMB 300,000 
(approximately $772 to $46,304).95  The 2008 amendments to patent law 
raised the range to RMB 10,000 to RMB 1,000,000 (approximately $1,543 
to $154,345).  The draft for the Fourth Amendment to Chinese Patent Law 
circulated in 2015, which is the most recent attempt to revise the patent law, 
proposes to further raise the range to RMB 100,000 to RMB 5,000,000 
(approximately $15,435 to $757,432). 96   There appears to be little logic 
articulated in setting the statutory damages range other than increasing it 
over time.  The selections of the upper and lower limits seem quite random, 
with little empirical backing.  Due to the long period of time needed to 
amend the patent law, this top-down approach of adjusting the statutory 
damages range seems to be particularly ill-fitted to deal with the ever 
changing reality of modern economy and technology.97  Essentially, policy 
makers task themselves to play the indefinite “catch-up” game in setting the 
statutory range, which seems to be quite unnecessary.  
The most problematic aspect of statutory damages is that they 
facilitate inappropriate behaviors, corruption, and local protectionism, which 
eventually undermine public confidence in China’s judicial institutions.  As 
illustrated above, there is little transparency in a typical statutory damages 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Gongsi yu Yan Xiuzhang Zhuanli Qinquan An (桐乡市自力有限责任公司与严秀章专利侵权案) [Zili Ltd. v. Yan 
Xiuzhang], HANG CIVIL THIRD TRIAL NO. 060 (Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Ct. 2005),  
http://2007.cnarb.com/zscq/P/patenttorts/201203/53974.html. 
95  Several Provisions 2001, supra note 32, at art. 21.  
96  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Xiuding Caoan (Songshen Gao) ji Duizhao Biao (中华人
民共和国专利修订草案（送审稿）及对照表) [The Draft for Amendments to Patent Law (Draft for 
Review) and The Comparison Table], LEGIS. AFF. OFF. OF THE ST. COUNCIL P.R. CHINA (Dec. 2, 2015) 
[hereinafter the Draft for the Fourth Amendments to Chinese Patent Law], 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/201512/20151200479591.shtml, translated in CHINA L. 
TRANSLATE, http://chinalawtranslate.com/scpatentdraft/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016); see also SIPO 
Commentary on Fourth Amendment, supra note 14; Q&As on Fourth Amendment, supra note 14. 
97  Generally speaking, the Chinese Patent Law is scheduled to be amended every eight years, and 
each round of amendment takes years to finalize.  For example, for the Third Amendment, the amendment 
process began with the SIPO’s notice seeking public comment on April 1, 2005, and the final amendment 
was not approved until December 27, 2008, which means the whole process took more than three years. 
See Zhuanli Fa Xiugai Licheng (专利法的修改历程 ) [The History of Patent Law Amendments], 
GAOHANGIP (June 17, 2015), http://www.gaohangip.com/baike/2941. 
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opinion, as most courts only recite boilerplate language.98  At a minimum, 
some judges, under the pressure of time, deploy the statutory damages 
approach as a shortcut around the time-consuming fact-finding and evidence 
examination processes. 99   In this scenario, a statutory damages award 
provides a cover-up for a judge who abandons his or her duty as an 
adjudicator, and reduces the court’s role to a random-number-generator in 
assessing damages awards.  On a more serious note, an extremely low 
damages award in a patent case might well be the product of corruption or 
other political considerations.100  This would be a serious setback for recent 
attempts to strengthen China’s judiciary.101  Additionally, it has been long 
observed that the corruption problem in China is often intertwined with local 
protectionism, which further incentivizes the lower courts to deploy the 
statutory damages approach. 102   As discussed before, the bare-bone 
recitation of boilerplate language in a statutory damages award opinion 
renders it impossible for patentees to raise any viable legal or factual 
argument on appeal.103  As a result, an appellate court reviewing a statutory 
damages award has little means to detect or combat local protectionism, 
even if it wants to.  
Taken together, not only is the existence of statutory damages in 
China’s patent law unjustifiable, its prevalence is actually damaging the 
legitimacy of its entire patent system.  Consequently, we strongly advocate 
the elimination of the statutory damages provision in Article 65 of Chinese 
Patent Law, which would, in turn, encourage the development of the other 
three more robust damages calculation approaches.  
                                                           
98  See supra text accompanying note 93. 
99  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 157. 
100  Id.; Wu, supra note 4, at 590–93 (noting that local government corruption is a major hindrance to 
the patent law enforcement); IP-Laitai, supra note 65 (noting that avoiding social instability is one reason 
why many judges choose low damages awards). 
101 Susan Finder, China’s Master Plan for Remaking Its Courts, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/chinas-master-plan-for-remaking-its-courts/; Stanley Lubman, Power Shift: 
Hopeful Signs in China’s Legal Reform Plan, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2014), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/10/power-shift-hopeful-signs-in-chinas-legal-reform-plan/; 
Improving Professionalism Among China’s Judges, GR. BRIT. CHINA CTR. (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.gbcc.org.uk/improving-professionalism-among-chinas-judges.aspx. 
102  Wu, supra note 4, at 590–93; Walneck, supra note 15, at 442, 462–66. 
103  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151. 
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IV. THE FUTILITY OF REFORMING THE STATUTORY DAMAGES SCHEME: A 
U.S. COPYRIGHT EXPERIENCE 
Interestingly, policy makers in China recognize the inadequate 
compensation problem in patent law and statutory damages’ key role in 
causing this problem, but nonetheless do not appear to be eager to eliminate 
the provision as we propose here.104  This general attitude of the policy 
makers invites the question whether the current statutory damages provision 
in Chinese patent law can be reformed to provide adequate compensation.  A 
comparative examination of the statutory damages provision in U.S. 
copyright law suggests that the answer is “maybe.”  The U.S. copyright law 
experience also shows that reforming the statutory damages provision, as 
opposed to abolishing it entirely, hardly leads to a long term resolution.  
Even though the statutory damages provision in U.S. copyright law does not 
have an under-compensation problem, the inherent rigidity and arbitrariness 
of a statutory damages approach still leads to other serious problems for U.S. 
copyright enforcement, which put its sustainability in doubt.  
From the outset, an examination of U.S. copyright law is instructive 
for two reasons.  First, U.S. copyright law experienced hundreds of years of 
development and its statutory damages provision was revised numerous 
times, which is illuminating for the path ahead of Chinese patent law.  
Second, the United States is often the most eager advocate to expand the 
statutory damages approach globally, and consequently exerts tremendous 
influence over other countries’ implementations of statutory damages 
schemes.105  
A. History of Statutory Damages in the United States Copyright 
Law 
The roots of the statutory damages regime in U.S. copyright law can 
be traced all the way back to the Statute of Anne in the Great Britain.106  
Specifically, the statute required the “offender” of any author’s copyright to 
forfeit the sum of “One Peny [sic] for every Sheet which shall be found in 
his, her, or their Custody, either Printed or Printing, Published or Exposed to 
                                                           
104  See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text; see also the Draft for the Fourth Amendments to 
Chinese Patent Law, supra note 96, at art. 68 (revising Art. 65 of Chinese Patent of 2008 to increase the 
statutory damages ranges to RMB 100,000 – RMB 5,000,000). 
105  Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 536–44 (noting that U.S. has been influential in 
encouraging implementation of a statutory damages provision in numerous countries through international 
treaties or its Special 301 procedures). 
106  Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne) 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.). 
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Sale.”107  Half of this amount went to the Crown and the remaining half 
belonged to the copyright holder.108  The United States inherited this basic 
framework in its Copyright Act of 1790, but broadened the scope of author’s 
right to include maps and charts, and set damages for published works at 50 
cents for “every sheet which shall be found in [offender’s] possession.”109  
The Copyright Act of 1790 was subsequently amended several times, which 
largely expanded the statutory damages provision.110  
The Copyright Act was amended in 1895 to increase the penalty for 
infringement to $1 per sheet for infringements in all works covered by the 
statute, with the exception that in the case of a painting, status, and statuary, 
the amount increased to $10 per sheet.111  Most notably for the purpose of 
this Article, this amendment set up a range-based penalty, as opposed to the 
per-sheet penalty, for “a photograph made from any object not a work of 
fine arts” to be no less than $100 and not greater than $5,000.112  This 
specific cap on the recovery of statutory damages for photographic works 
was largely pushed by newspaper publishers who had to pay excessive 
damages for unknowingly printing and circulating millions of infringing 
copies of a photograph. 113   As one practitioner noted, “the adoption of 
minimum and maximum statutory amounts was significant because it 
signaled a concern that statutory damages could be immense if they were not 
limited, particularly as technology made copying of mass quantities of 
physical works easier.”114 
 The Copyright Act went through a comprehensive overhaul in 1909, 
which set up the modern scheme for copyright protection.  The 1909 Act 
                                                           
107  Id. § 2.  
108  Id. 
109  Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831).  Similar to the Statute of Anne, half of 
the amount went to the author and the other half went to the United States government.  
110  See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 6, 4 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870); Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 
169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870).  
111  Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 194, 28 Stat. 965 (repealed 1909) (amending Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 
230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952)). 
112  Id.  However, it should be noted that this Act was not the first copyright legislation that set up a 
range-based penalty.  Several U.S. colonies already included range-based statutory damages provisions in 
their copyright laws. See William F. Patry, The Right to a Jury Trial in Copyright Cases, 29 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 150 (1981).  In 1856, Congress also amended the copyright law to allow copyright 
owners to recover not less than $100 for the first, nor less than $50 for subsequent, unauthorized public 
performances of dramatic compositions. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. 
113  Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement 
Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 
276–77 (2009). 
114  Id. at 277. 
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provided major reforms in three respects.115  First, the Act authorized the 
award of actual damages and defendant’s profits (or the “in lieu” 
damages). 116   Second, the Act eliminated the per-sheet penalty, whose 
previous penal functions were served instead by a criminal provision for 
willful infringing for profit, and whose compensatory and deterrent 
functions were taken on by the availability of monetary relief for actual 
damages and defendant’s profits.117  Third, a new generalized regime of 
statutory damages was created, available “in lieu” of actual damages and 
defendant’s profits.118  Specifically, a court was directed to make awards in 
an amount that was “just,” but within range for statutory damages between 
$250 and $5,000 per infringement.119   Subsequently, courts interpreted that 
statutory damages should be used as an alternative to actual damages or 
profits when such damages or profits are hard to prove, and thus refused to 
award statutory damages when actual damages or profits could be proven.120  
It has been noted that the U.S. Congress largely designed the statutory 
damages scheme for a compensatory rather than a deterrent purpose.121  
After decades of public debate and preparation, the U.S. Congress 
enacted a completely new copyright act in 1976.122  Under Section 504 of 
the new act, a plaintiff may elect either actual damages plus infringer’s profit 
or statutory damages.123  If the plaintiff chooses to pursue statutory damages, 
a court may still consider evidence of actual damages and profits in 
calculating the statutory damages award.124  Under the original version of 
1976 Act, the range of a statutory damages award per work infringed was 
“not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court consider just,” but if 
the copyright owner proved that the “infringement was committed willfully, 
the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a 
                                                           
115  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 448.  
116  Id.  
117  Copyright Act of 1909, §§ 25, 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081–82 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) 
(2006)). 
118  Id.  
119  Id.  
120  See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1940); Zeigelheim v. 
Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). 
121  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 450–51. 
122  Copyrights Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 
504 (2011)). 
123  See H.R. REP. 94-1476, 162, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010)). 
124  H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 161. 
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sum of not more than $50,000.”125  This statutory range was subsequently 
increased multiple times over the years.  The Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988 further doubled the statutory damages range to 
$500–$20,000 for non-willful infringement, and correspondingly increased 
the upper-limit for willful infringement to $100,000.126  The Digital Theft 
Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999 once again 
increased the statutory damages range by 50%, $750–$30,000 per work 
infringed for non-willful infringement and set a maximum of $150,000 per 
work infringed for willful infringement.127  These statutory ranges remain in 
force today.  At this point, commentators have observe that “[t]he 
application of statutory damages has too often strayed from the largely 
compensatory impulse . . . and has focused too heavily on deterrence and 
punishment by holding many ordinary infringements to be willful, which has 
resulted in many awards that are punitive in effect and often in intent.”128 
  Though the exact mechanism of Chinese patent law’s statutory 
damages scheme is different from that of U.S. copyright law, the patterns of 
their development reveal some common themes.  For example, the statutory 
damages schemes in both systems appear to stem from similar concerns.  It 
appears that the U.S. Congress adopted statutory damages because it was 
difficult to calculate actual damages in copyright cases.129  As we noted 
above, this was also likely the initial legislative intent for adopting the 
statutory damages approach in China’s patent law.130  Further, the policy 
makers in both countries had to constantly readjust the statutory damages 
ranges to handle new realities of modern economics and technology.  
Accordingly, the U.S. copyright law experience reveals some of the 
struggles that the Chinese Patent Law’s statutory damages scheme is likely 
to face going forward. 
                                                           
125  Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c) (1976), as reprinted in 5 KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 
1976, at 163–64 (Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone eds., 1984). 
126  Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 (1988). 
127  Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160 
(1999). 
128  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 445. 
129  Id. at 496 (“That damages in copyright cases are sometimes difficult to prove may have been the 
initial impetus for creating a general statutory damages provision in U.S. copyright law.”); R. Collin 
Kilgore, Sneering at the Law: An Argument for Punitive Damages in Copyright, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 637, 652-53 (2013) (noting that actual damages in copyright cases are often difficult and at times 
impossible to prove, and the election of statutory damages allows plaintiffs to avoid such difficulties). 
130  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
April 2017 Chinese Patent Law’s Statutory Damages Provision 233 
 
 
      
 
B. The Problems of U.S. Copyright Statutory Damages Scheme    
The statutory damages scheme has been in existence since the 
inception of U.S. copyright law and countless efforts have been made to 
refine it.  However, the scheme does not function as effectively as Congress 
intended. Over the years, three major problems have been identified in the 
current U.S. copyright statutory damages scheme. 
First, statutory damages in certain copyright cases can be “grossly 
excessive.”131  This problem can be particularly serious within the peer-to-
peer (P2P) file sharing context in today’s Internet age.  For example, in Sony 
BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, five major record labels brought 
suit against Joel Tenenbaum, then a twenty-four year-old college graduate, 
for illegally uploading thirty songs onto P2P networks like Napster and 
Limewire.132  Eventually, the jury rendered a statutory damages award of 
$675,000, with $22,500 for each of the thirty infringed works.  In another 
similarly notorious case, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, three trials 
resulted in awards of $222,000, $1.92 million, and $1.5 million ($9,250, 
$80,000, and $62,500 per work, respectively). 133  Such large amounts of 
damages become particularly problematic where there is little proof that the 
infringement caused any actual harm or the infringer actually profited from 
it.134  Within the academic field, there is a fierce debate on whether some of 
the statutory damages awards in copyright cases are so excessive that they 
actually implicated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.135 
                                                           
131  Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 441. 
132  Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013). 
133  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp.2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008); Capitol Records 
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1049–50 (D. Minn. 2010); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-
Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012). 
134  See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 480–90 (listing several examples where excessive 
damages were awarded even though it was clear that the infringement caused little actual damages and the 
infringer benefited little from the infringement). 
135  Compare Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 491–97 (arguing that some of the statutory 
damages in copyright cases might be unconstitutionally excessive under BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996)), with Steven M. Tepp, The Constitutional Challenge to Statutory Damages for Copyright 
Infringement: Don’t Gore Section 504, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUP. 93 (2009) 
(arguing that BMW v. Gore does not apply to the statutory damages provision of Copyright Act, and the 
copyright statutory damages schemes would pass the constitutional muster); see also Pamela Samuelson & 
Ben Sheffner, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damages Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 53 (2009) (transcribing the debate between Professor Samuelson and Mr. Sheffner, 
NBC Universal Inc.’s copyright attorney regarding the constitutionality of statutory damages provision in 
U.S. copyright law). 
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Second, large awards of statutory damages leads to problematic 
enforcement tactics that abuse the copyright system.  While the problem of 
patent trolls has been recognized for some time, the problem of copyright 
trolls is on the rise in recent years.136  It is reported that some litigious 
copyright holders would file hundreds, if not thousands, of lawsuits against 
tens of thousands of anonymous Internet users.137  These cases rarely end up 
in trial; instead, the copyright trolls would file “boilerplate complaints based 
on a modicum of evidence calculated to maximize settlement profits by 
minimizing costs and profits.”138  Commentators and industry shareholders 
both pointed out that statutory damages play a major role in facilitating such 
abusive litigious behavior.139  
Ironically, the third problem associated with U.S. copyright law’s 
current statutory damages scheme is its utter ineffectiveness in deterring 
copyright infringement despite the regularity of excessive damages 
awards. 140   In the context of a content consuming industry, a copyright 
owner often elects to sue intermediaries for secondary infringement instead 
of suing individual end-consumers for cost-effectiveness reasons. 141  
However, statutory damages awarded against these intermediaries for 
secondary infringement rarely incentivize the direct infringers to stop the 
                                                           
136  Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1111–19 (2015); 
James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age 
of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 91 (2012). 
137  Interestingly, the most active “copyright trolls” in the U.S. appeared to be adult movie studios. In 
was reported that the most litigious studio, Malibu Media (X-Art) filed over 4500 copyright infringement 
cases in less than 4 years. See Andy, New York Judge Puts Break on Copyright Troll Subpoenas, 
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/new-york-judge-puts-brakes-on-copyright-troll-
subpoenas-151007/.  
138  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND 
STATUTORY DAMAGES 74 (2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf 
[hereinafter COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WHITE PAPER]; see also EFF Calls For Court Sanctions For Copyright Troll’s 
Public Humiliation Tactic, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/malibu-media (last visited Feb. 29, 2016) 
(describing Malibu Media’s tactic of filing long lists of adult movie titles on the public record, accusing an Internet user of 
illegally downloading those movies, and “humiliating” these Internet users to settle). 
139  Sag, supra note 136, at 1121–27, 1135 (pointing out the statutory damages and joinder rules play 
major roles in leading to abusive litigation behaviors of copyright trolls, and advocating reforming the 
statutory damages scheme in U.S. copyright law); DeBriyn, supra note 136, at 106–09 (noting that the 
existence of statutory damages is the prerequisite of current copyright troll problem and advocating 
removing the statutory damages provision all together). 
140  Kilgore, supra note 129, at 657-58; see also Anna Cronk, The Punishment Doesn’t Fit the Crime – 
Why and How Congress Should Revise the Statutory Copyright Damages Provision for Noncommercial 
Infringements on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Networks, 39 SW. L. REV. 181 (2009). 
141  Berg, supra note 113, at 310 (“Suing intermediaries may be cost-effective for the content 
industries because in a single lawsuit they can eliminate a mechanism that a large number of end-users are 
using to infringe . . . ”).  
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infringement.142  On the contrary, when these legitimate intermediaries are 
consequently forced out of the market en masse, the end-consumers often 
turn to underground markets.143  This in turn decreases compliance with the 
law and further aggravates infringement. 144   A more concerning 
effectiveness problem with the statutory damages scheme is that it often hits 
the small players hard, but spares the truly egregious infringers.  For 
example, in the Thomas case, the defendant, a single mother, was ordered to 
pay statutory damages of nearly a $250,000 dollars for twenty-four music 
works she uploaded onto Kazza.com.145  Even the courts admitted that the 
defendant, who “acted like countless other Internet users,” was simply 
seeking access to free music and not trying to make any profits through her 
infringement. 146   In contrast, when an egregious infringer’s profits 
significantly exceed the maximum statutory damages available, the 
defendant may refuse to appear in court and force the court to resort to 
statutory damages in a default judgment.147  This is essentially the same 
difficulty a patent owner in China faces in obtaining damages.148 
C. Lessons for Chinese Patent Law’s Statutory Damages Scheme  
At first glance, the problems associated with the statutory damages 
schemes in Chinese patent law and U.S. copyright law are polar opposite: 
inadequate damages for Chinese patent law and excessive damages in U.S. 
copyright law.  However, these two problems are merely different symptoms 
rooted in the same disease: the inherent arbitrariness of the statutory 
damages approach.  Because statutory damages are fundamentally 
“untethered from anything,” there is no meaningful reform available to fix it 
without essentially abandoning the statutory damages approach.149  If the 
                                                           
142  Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Reducing Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1350-51 (2004). 
143  Berg, supra note 113, at 313; see also Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 266 (2005). 
144  Berg, supra note 113, at 313 (noting that, in the context of P2P, the empirical evidence has shown 
that shutting down various P2P file-sharing networks has actually led to an increase in direct infringement 
instead of a decrease). 
145  Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008).  
146  Id. at 1227. 
147  Kilgore, supra note 129, at 657–58 (noting that in Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolus Records, 370 
F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2004), the defendant intentionally refused to appear in court, which was likely a 
deliberate tactic to force the court to resort to statutory damages in avoiding the likely larger damages based 
on its profits). 
148  As discussed above, a patent infringer in China would simply refuse to cooperate in supplying 
necessary evidence to assist plaintiff in calculating the actual damages or infringer’s profits, which in turn 
forces the court to resort to the statutory damages approach.  
149  COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 138, at 73.  
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purpose of awarding statutory damages is supposed to be compensatory, the 
statutory damages awarded are not tied to the amount of harm caused.  Nor 
are these damages tied to the amount of unjust profits made by an infringer, 
or any realistic assessment of what an appropriate deterrence would be, to 
fulfil any sense of punitive purpose.  Consequently, even though the U.S. 
has attempted to inject nuances into its copyright law’s statutory damages 
scheme for many years, there are simply no guiding principles for courts to 
apply in determining a proper level of damages other than keeping it within 
the statutory range.  
Moreover, the problems associated with the statutory damages scheme 
in current U.S. copyright law are indicative of what Chinese patent law will 
likely face in the future.  As discussed above, due to its rigidity, whether 
statutory damages can effectively compensate an injured patent owner 
depends, in part, on what level of compensation the policy maker provides in 
the first place.150  As policy makers in China gradually increase the upper- 
and lower limits of the statutory ranges of patent damages, it is a possibility 
that the policy makers will over-correct the problem by setting a 
compensation level too high.  This may lead to the systematic abuse problem 
prevalent in today’s U.S. copyright system.151  The recent proposal for the 
Fourth Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law already points to some early 
signs of over-correction, as it proposes significantly increase the minimum 
statutory damages by ten-fold, from RMB 10,000 to 100,000, and to increase 
the maximum statutory damages by five-fold, from RMB 1,000,000 to RMB 
5,000,000.152  
Finally, as demonstrated by the U.S. copyright law experience, 
because there is essentially no underlying principle to be applied 
consistently across the cases, statutory damages punish some infringers by 
overcompensating the right holders while leaving other right holders 
undercompensated, no matter what the statutory range the policy makers set 
                                                           
150  See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
151  See supra text accompanying notes 136–139. 
152  The recent draft for the Fourth Amendment to Chinese Patent Law proposed to significantly 
increase the minimum statutory damages by ten-fold, from RMB 10,000 to 100,000, and to increase the 
maximum statutory damages by five-fold, from RMB 1,000,000 to RMB 5,000,000.  See LEGISLATIVE 
AFFAIRS OFFICE OF THE ST. COUNCIL P.R. CHINA, supra note 96.  Curiously, this draft also proposed to add 
a specific “punitive damages” provision, which allow a court to award up to three times the damages 
assessed based on patentee’s loss approach, infringer’s profits approach or reasonable royalty approach. Id. 
This new provision appears to further the confusion on what purpose the statutory damages provision 
actually serves in the overall damages calculation scheme by instituting two punitive damages provisions 
within one article. See text accompanying supra notes 29–30.  
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it to be.153  The statutory damages scheme in the Chinese patent law is 
unlikely to avoid this dilemma given all the confusion regarding what 
purpose the statutory damages provision actually serves.154  Accordingly, we 
argue that any attempt to further amend the current statutory damages 
provision in Chinese patent law would likely be counterproductive as it will 
lead to other equally troubling problems.  
V. BUILDING A ROBUST DAMAGES CALCULATION SCHEME FOR CHINESE 
PATENT LAW WITHOUT THE STATUTORY DAMAGES PROVISION: U.S. 
AND GERMAN PATENT LAW EXPERIENCE 
 Admittedly, eliminating the statutory damages scheme from Chinese 
patent law is not without risk.  As discussed before, the impetus for the 
People’s Supreme Court to adopt a statutory damage “exception” in 2001 
was the difficulty to prove damages through the three formal approaches— 
(1) patentee’s losses, (2) infringer’s profits, and (3) reasonable royalty.155  
Arguably, a patent system without the statutory damages scheme in today’s 
China may still leave the patent owners where they started back in 2001: 
unable to obtain any damages at all.  However, we argue that the policy 
makers in China need to adopt a forward-looking attitude when solving the 
current under-compensation problem in the patent system.  Instead of 
shortcutting the damages determination with a statutory damages provision, 
more attention needs to be given to improving the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the other three approaches.156  In other words, eliminating the 
statutory damages provision is merely the first step in a more comprehensive 
reform.  If the U.S. copyright law experience demonstrates the futility of 
reforming the Chinese patent law’s statutory damage scheme, the U.S. and 
German patent law experience illustrates the feasibility for China to develop 
a robust damages calculation scheme without a statutory damages scheme.157 
                                                           
153  See text accompanying supra notes 140–148. 
154  See text accompanying supra notes 29–30 (illustrating the confusion on whether the statutory 
damages in Chinese patent law are compensatory in nature or punitive in nature). 
155  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
156  See Liu, supra note 36 (the Director of the Third Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court 
remarked that the low compensation problem in China’s patent system cannot be solved by simply 
increasing the statutory damages ranges, and that developing the discovery mechanism is the key to 
fundamentally solve the problem). 
157  The Authors adopted the United States and Germany as examples for two reasons: (1) both 
countries have robust and effective patent protection system; (2) both countries have huge influences on the 
development of Chinese patent system. 
238 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL.  26 NO.  2 
 
A. Damages Award in the United States Patent Law 
On the substantive front, the current U.S. patent law prescribes two 
types of compensatory damages for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 
284.158  First, if the patent owner and the infringer are competitors in the 
same market, the patent owner may state a claim for its own lost profits in 
the form of sales diversion, price erosion, or increased expense.159  Second, 
if the patent owner and the infringer are not competitors, or the patent owner 
cannot establish lost profits with sufficient evidence, the patent owner can 
claim an established or hypothetical royalty.160  A reasonable royalty based 
on hypothetical negotiation acts as the floor of a potential damages 
recovery.161 A damage award can include both lost profits and reasonable 
royalty.162  
To claim lost profits, a patent owner must show that “but for” the 
infringement it would have earned the profits it alleges it lost, and the loss of 
those profits was reasonably foreseeable consequence of the infringement.163 
One way to establish this “but-for” causation is to demonstrate the four 
Panduit factors: (1) a demand for the patented product, (2) an absence of 
acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) the patent holder had 
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the 
amount of profit the patent owner would have made. 164   However the 
Panduit standard is not the exclusive standard used to establish but-for 
causation.165  If the subject patent only covers one component of a multi-
component product, the patent owner may only recover the lost profits 
corresponding to the portion.166  However, if a patent owner proves that the 
                                                           
158  The relevant statute reads: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant 
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the 
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 (2011) 
159  7-20 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03, Part 1 of 3 (Mathew Bender ed.  2016); 
see also Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[D]amages may include lost profits 
due to diverted sales, price erosion, and increased expenditures caused by the infringement.”).  
160  CHISUM, supra note 159.  
161  See 35 U.S.C. § 284;  see also Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronic Int’l, Inc., 
246 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the minimum damage a patent owner may recovery is the 
reasonable royalty). 
162  See WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming 
damage award include both lost profits and reasonable royalties). 
163  4 ROBERT A. MATHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 30:22 (March 2016 Update). 
164  Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
165  Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
166  Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615 (1912) (holding 
that when “plaintiff’s patent only created a part of the profits, he is only entitled to recover that part of the 
net gains.”). 
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“patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand,” he may be 
rewarded based on the value of the total product without any apportionment 
of value between the patented and unpatented features.167  This is commonly 
referred as the “Entire Market Value Rule.”168 
On the other hand, a patent owner may claim a reasonable royalty, 
which is “what a willing licensor and licensee would bargain for during 
hypothetical negotiations on the date the infringement started.” 169   This 
reasonable royalty is typically calculated by multiplying a royalty rate by a 
royalty base. 170   A court typically considers the fifteen George-Pacific 
factors to determine the royalty rate.171  The royalty base should generally be 
based on the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit.”172  The Entire Market 
Value Rule similarly applies to the reasonable royalty context as well.173  
On the procedural front, the amount of damages suffered by a patentee 
as a result of infringement is an issue of fact that is determined by either a 
jury or the court.174  The court has the discretion to bifurcate the damages 
determination phase and the liability phase.175  However, bifurcation of the 
liability phase and damages phase in the U.S. context tends to result in 
considerable delay and extra costs because (1) the parties need to separate 
discovery pertaining to damages issues, and (2) sometimes a new jury needs 
to be assembled.176  Typically, each party will present a damages expert to 
explain how the fact-finder (jury or court) should calculate damages and to 
testify on a variety of factors underlying the determination of lost profits or a 
reasonable royalty. 177   Other fact witnesses, including the inventor and 
corporate officers, will have to testify on many of these subjects throughout 
the trial. 178   It is also noteworthy that the United States has the most 
extensive, and probably cumbersome, discovery mechanism, which typically 
                                                           
167  MATHEWS, JR., supra note 163. 
168  Id. 
169  State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus. Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
170 MATHEWS, JR., supra note 163. 
171  George-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).   
172  LaserDynamic, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
173  Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1310, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
174  MATHEWS, JR., supra note 163. 
175  See FED. R. CIV. P. 42; KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, 
PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 303, 307, 931 (4th ed. 2013). 
176  MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 175, at 309. 
177  Id. at 931-32. 
178  Id. 
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is the primary driver for litigation expenses.179  It is widely recognized that 
the uneven discovery burden between a patentee and an infringer is the 
primary driver for the “patent troll” problem in the United States.180  
Finally, 35 U.S.C. § 284 also allows a court to exercise its discretion 
to “increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”181  
The relating case law mandates that such treble damages are appropriate 
only if the court finds the infringement to be “willful.”182  The exact standard 
for determining “willfulness” is in flux pending Supreme Court review.183 
However, it is generally undisputed that treble damages are a punitive 
damages provision in U.S. patent law.184 
B. Damages Award in German Patent Law  
Unlike its U.S. counterpart, patent law in Germany provides no 
punitive damages. 185   Nonetheless, the compensatory damages must be 
“sufficiently high to provide a deterrent effect.”186  On the substantive front, 
                                                           
179  Id. at 193–253; see also John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547 (2010). 
180  John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2124–35 (2007); 
Christopher Hu, Some Observations on the Patent Troll Litigation Problem, 26 No. 8 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 10, 12 (2014); J. Jason Williams, Mark V. Campagna, & Oliva E. Marbutt, Strategies for 
Combatting Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368 (2010); Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and 
Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 196–99 (2015). 
181  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).  
182  See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1853) (suggesting that a discretionary increase in 
damages under the 1836 Act should be reserved only for “the wanton and malicious pirate”); Union 
Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1960) (holding that increased 
damages are for “conscious and wilful [sic] infringer”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 
377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964) (noting that increased damages are only available “in a case of willful or bad-
faith infringement”). 
183  Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 774 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014), withdrawn and replaced by 
Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 19, 2015) 
(the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the current willfulness standard need to changed). 
184  See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008) (listing Section 284 among 
punitive damages statutes); Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 196 (1881) (“[T]he Patent Act of 1836 . . . 
leav[es] it to the discretion of the court to inflict punitive damages to the extent of trebling the verdict.”); 
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“When willful 
infringement or bad faith has been found, the remedy of enhancement of damages not only serve its 
primary punitive/deterrent role, but in so doing it has the secondary benefit of quantifying the equities as 
between patentee and infringer.”); Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 413 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Enhanced damages are punitive, not compensatory.”). 
185  ALEXANDER HARGUTH & STEVEN CARLSON, PATENTS IN GERMANY AND EUROPE: PROCUREMENT, 
ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE – AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 213 (2011).  
186  Id. 
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there are three methods available to calculate actual damages: (1) patentee’s 
lost profits, (2) infringer’s profits, and (3) reasonable royalty.187 
For the patentee’s lost profits approach, the patentee generally bears 
the burden to prove the extent of its lost profits.188  Similar to U.S. law, the 
patentee in Germany must also prove that it indeed lost profits due to the 
infringement, which is akin to the “but for” causation in U.S. patent law.189 
This causation, in turn, requires the patentee to prove that he actually used 
the patent directly, and that there is at least a probability that he would 
realize the lost profits.190  This is typically very challenging for patentees to 
prove unless the market is well-developed and well-defined.191  Further, a 
patentee seeking damages under this method is also required to disclose its 
own detailed price calculation, which goes against the will of many 
companies.192 As a result, this “lost profits” approach is rarely used in real 
practice.193 
For the infringer’s profits, damages are calculated by subtracting the 
“costs of the business” from the infringer’s net revenue.194  The patentee 
typically needs to determine the infringer’s net revenue and costs through a 
“rendering of accounts” proceeding.195  Similarly to U.S. law, the court must 
consider what portion of the profits can be effectively attributed to the 
infringement, and the damages should be adjusted accordingly. 196   This 
method is substantially easier than the patentee’s lost profits approach, and 
approximately 75% of patent damages calculations adopt this approach.197 
Where the patentee’s lost profits and infringer’s profits do not justify 
a sufficient damages award, the reasonable royalty approach provides a 
baseline measurement.198  The doctrinal premise underpinning this approach 
                                                           
187  Id.; see also JOHANN PITZ, ATSUSHI KAWADA & JEFFREY A. SCHWAB, PATENT LITIGATION IN 
GERMANY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 52–54 (2015). 
188  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 216; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 52–
53.  
189  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 217; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 52–
53. 
190  Federal Supreme Court, 1 ZR 132/60, GRUR 1962, 509, “Dia-Rähmchen II.” 
191  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 217; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 52–
53. 
192  PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 53. 
193  Id. 
194  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 217; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 53. 
195  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 218. 
196  Id. at 217-18; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 53. 
197  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 217; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 53. 
198  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 214. 
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is the principle that an unauthorized user should not be better off compared 
to a user who legally obtained a license.199  Similar to the U.S. law, this 
approach is premised on a hypothetical license that both parties would have 
agreed upon at the time of the infringement. 200   The framework of 
determining a reasonable royalty is essentially the same with U.S. law: the 
royalty base times the royalty rate.201  Typically, the royalty base is the net 
revenue made by the infringing products.202  However, where the patent only 
covers one of many different components or features of a product, concepts 
comparable to “apportionment” and the “smallest salable patent practicing 
unit” also exist in German patent law.203  As to the royalty rate, a court 
typically looks into existing license agreements in the market and the 
customary industry practice as a starting point.204  Then, the court will adjust 
this starting rate based on a collection of factors, such as the technological 
and economic importance of the invention, interaction between the royalty 
base and the amount of the rate, volume of sales, the risks a normal licensee 
bear that an infringer may avoid, and marketing efforts or business 
connections that drove the sales.205 
On the procedural front, there is no jury for any part of the trial.  The 
determination of liability is completely bifurcated from the damages 
determination in German patent law.206  After the liability proceeding, or the 
“first stage” proceeding, if the court finds the infringer liable for 
infringement, the patentee must post a bond and may demand the infringer to 
“render an accounting.”207  During this process, the infringer is under the 
obligation to render the patentee an account of all substantial facts necessary 
for the calculation of patentee’s damages, including the quantity of the 
infringing products, the sales price of infringing products, dates of delivery, 
customer lists, and a calculation of production costs.208  The accounting 
                                                           
199  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 21, 2012, X ZR 36/80, [GRUR] 1982, 
286 (“Fersenabstützvorrichtung”). 
200  PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 53. 
201  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 214–15. 
202  Id. at 214. 
203  This is largely established through the case law of the Federal Supreme Court. For example, to 
determine whether the royalty base should be apportioned down to one component of the infringing product, 
the court has to determine: (1) which part of the product is covered by the invention; and (2) if such a part 
can be identified, whether such part can be sold separately. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Mar. 14, 2000, X ZR 8/90, [GRUR] 1992, 599 (“Teleskopzylinder”); Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf 
OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court] July 17, 2009, 2 U 38/08, Beck RS 2010, 21821 “Kappaggregat.”   
204  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 215. 
205  Id. at 216. 
206  Id. at 213; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 52. 
207  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 213. 
208  PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 51–52. 
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rendered must be sufficiently specific to allow the patentee to calculate its 
losses.209  In most cases, the parties resolve the damages amount out of 
court.210  If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the patentee must file a 
separate lawsuit, the “second stage” proceeding, to request a court to 
determine the damages. 211  Once a damages proceeding is initiated, the 
patentee may elect to pursue damages under any one of the three calculation 
methods.212  Further, the patentee may freely change from one method to 
another until the court enters a final judgement on the damages amount.213 
C. Lessons for Chinese Patent Law 
Patent law presents a level of complexity and difficulty that typically 
demands extraordinary attention to legal nuance. 214   Damages 
determinations in patent cases are no exception.  The U.S. and German 
experiences are particularly illuminating when determining how China can 
build a robust patent damages regime without the statutory damages 
provision. 
On the substantive front, both U.S. and German patent law illustrate 
the necessity of developing a body of relevant laws to deal with the 
complexity of patent cases.  For example, as demonstrated by the German 
experience, the difficulty of proving actual losses is not a problem unique to 
China’s patent system. 215   However, the infringer’s profits approach has 
great potential to fill in the void if some basic discovery mechanism is 
established and strengthened.216  As argued by countless scholars, China 
may as well look into the numerous well-established doctrinal principles in 
U.S. and German patent law, such as the price erosion theory, the entire 
market value rule, but-for causation, and the direct competition test, to speed 
up the development of its patent damages laws.217  Further, China needs to 
substantially expand the reasonable royalty approach by relaxing the 
                                                           
209  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 213. 
210  Id. at 213. 
211  HARGUTH & CARLSON, supra note 185, at 213; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 52. 
212  PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 52. 
213  Id. at 54. 
214  See Jennifer K. Bush, John E. Gartman & Elizabeth I Rogers, Six Patent Law Puzzlers, 13 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2014); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Stephan Kinsella, The Difficulty and Complexity of Patent Law, 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INNOVATIVE FREEDOM (July 24, 2014), http://c4sif.org/2014/07/the-difficulty-and-
complexity-of-patent-law/.  
215  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
216  See supra text accompanying notes 194–197. 
217  Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 155–56; Zhang, supra note 69, at 68. 
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requirement for an existing license.218  Both the U.S. and German experience 
demonstrate that this reasonable royalty approach can be extraordinarily 
adaptable to handle complex cases involving advanced technologies.219 
On the procedural front, German patent law provides more insightful 
lessons as its judicial system is relatively close to the Chinese system.220 
Specifically, it is unthinkable how China can advance its patent system 
without strengthening its discovery mechanism.  Admittedly, a discovery 
mechanism as elaborate as the U.S.’s system might not be entirely 
desirable.221  However, a procedure akin to the “rendering an accounting” 
process in German patent law is desperately needed in the current Chinese 
system.  Encouragingly, the policy makers in China appear to be taking 
some positive steps on this front in the past year.222  Further, the current 
Chinese patent statute instructs courts to apply the four approaches in a 
sequential order to determine damages.223  It is unclear why this is necessary.  
Nor is it clear whether courts actually follow this instruction.224  Instead of 
letting a court dictate the agenda, policy makers in China should allow a 
patentee to freely choose the calculation approaches that he deems 
appropriate (either because it authorizes the highest damages award or it has 
the most sufficient evidentiary backing).  Finally, bifurcating the liability 
phase and damages determination phase may be another plausible 
                                                           
218  See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 156. 
219  See supra notes 169–173, 198–205 and accompanying text. 
220  Though China is not a civil law country in a strict sense, the Chinese system does have many 
elements of a typical civil law system. 
221 See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. 
222  The drafters for the Fourth Amendment to the Chinese patent law clearly have this in mind. 
Specifically, the proposed Article 68 provides that “[a]fter establishing a violation of patent rights, to 
determine the amount of compensation in situations where the patentee has already produced evidence to 
the extent possible and the books and materials related to the infringement are primarily in the hands of the 
infringer, people’s courts may order the infringer to provide books and materials relevant to the infringing 
conduct; if the infringer does not so provide, or provides false books and materials, the people’s courts can 
determine the amount of compensation from consideration of the patentee’s desire and the evidence they 
have provided.” See Draft for the Fourth Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law, supra note 96, art. 68.  
The Supreme People’s Court, in its recent Judicial Interpretation of Patent Law, instructed lower courts that 
“when actual losses are difficult to determine, the court shall require the patentee to come forth with 
evidence to prove the infringer’s profits. If the patentee supplies sufficient preliminary evidence, and the 
relevant accounting and documents are in the infringer’s possession, the court may order the infringers to 
supply such documents.  If the infringer refuses to supply such evidence or supplies falsified documents, 
the court may calculated the damages based on the patentee’s claim and the preliminary evidence supplied.”  
See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Qinfan Zhuanli Quan Jiufen Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan 
Wenti De Jieshi Er (最高人民法院关于审理侵犯专利纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的解释（二）) 
[Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Applicable Laws to the Trial 
of Patent Dispute Cases (Second)] (Mar. 22, 2016), (Sup. People’s Ct. 2016), 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/sfjs/201603/t20160322_1253917.html. 
223  Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2.  
224  See supra notes 94, 98–102 and accompanying text.  
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adjustment that is worth considering.  For one thing, it sets up a procedural 
hurdle to encourage the parties to settle the matter out of the court. 225  
Moreover, it might alleviate the time pressure put on a court to adjudicate 
both liability and damages in a single proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
At one time, the statutory damages provision might have served a 
worthy purpose in the Chinese patent system.  That time has clearly come to 
an end.  It is nearly impossible to find any doctrinal justification for the 
existence of Chinese patent law’s statutory damages provision.  On a 
practical level, not only do statutory damages drive the overall damages in 
patent cases down to an unjustifiable level, but such damages are also 
fundamentally detrimental to the legitimacy of the entire patent system of 
China.  The current policy discussion on adjusting the statutory range 
distracts policy makers from the root of the problem and hinders the 
development of real solutions.226 Instead of holding on to this Band-Aid 
style fix, Chinese policy makers are better off without it. 
The encouraging side of the story is that, if the statutory damages 
provision is eliminated, the shareholders of Chinese patent system have 
demonstrated the potential to advance the reforms proposed in this Article. 
On one hand, the cases like Qihoo 360 Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Sogou Info. Serv. 
Co., Ltd. demonstrate Chinese jurists’ capability to render a fair and nuanced 
determination in a case that involved complex technologies without resorting 
to the statutory damages approach.227  On the other, the Supreme People’s 
Court has illustrated its ability and willingness to take a leadership role in 
developing the body of law through judicial interpretation and guiding 
cases.228  These developments indicate the great potential for China to build 
                                                           
225  Logically speaking, an infringer that has been determined to be liable will be more willing to settle 
with the patentee. 
226 The current proposal for the fourth amendment to the Chinese Patent Law and related policy 
discussion devoted a lot of energy on what the lower- and upper- limits of the statutory damages range 
should be. See Draft for the Fourth Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law, supra note 96, art. 68. 
227  See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.  
228  See Liu, supra note 36 (discussing the Supreme People’s Court’s most recent Judicial 
Interpretation of Patent Law); see also Lifeng Wang, The Necessity and Function of China’s Guiding Cases 
System, STAN. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, Oct. 15, 2013, 
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/9-professor-wang/; Jianchao Liang, A Discussion of the Use of 
Guiding Cases in Judges Training, STAN. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, July 1, 2013, 
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/commentaries/8-judge-liang/; He Jing, A Significant Step Made by the Supreme 
People’s Court Through the Draft Trademark Law Judicial Interpretation, CHINA LAW VISION, Nov. 11, 
2014, http://www.chinalawvision.com/2014/11/articles/intellectual-property-1/a-significant-step-made-by-
the-supreme-peoples-court-through-the-draft-trademark-law-judicial-interpretation/; Judicial Interpretation 
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a better, stronger, and more efficient patent protection regime without the 
statutory damages provision.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
by the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China Contract Law: A Clarification or New 
(Judge-Made) Law, HOGANLOVELLS (June 2009), 
http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/1f662b3a-7702-46d0-ab7b-
65ca7d766dd8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f2aec586-eb56-49ec-968d-
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